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ÖZET
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin Avrupa Birliği’ne üyeliği sürecinde yargı reformaları 
taraflar arasında ciddi bir tartışma konusu olmaya devam etmektedir. Savcı ve 
hakim arasındaki yakın ilişki ve bunun bir sonucu olarak yargı tarafsızlığının 
zedelenmesi ihtimali bu reformlara çok önemli bir gerekçe teşkil etmektedir. 
Avrupa Birliği Komisyonu tarafından hazırlanan tavsiye raporunda, hakimler 
ve savcılar arasındaki bu yakın ilişki göz önünde bulundurularak Türkiye 
Cumhuriyeti Yargı sisteminin işleyişine ilişkin önerilerde bulunuldu. Bu yakın 
ilişki Cristopher Larkins’in tanımıyla “bağımlı bir yargı”nın var olduğuna 
işaret etmektedir. Avrupa Birliği Komisyonu üyelik sürecinde bu durumu 
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin gerçekleştirmesi gerekecek reformlar için güçlü bir 
tartışma konusu yapmaktadır.
ABSTRACT                                                                                            
With the continuing drive for Turkish entrance into the EU, judicial reform 
continues to be an important battleground for both sides. An integral part of 
these reforms is the appearance of close proximity between prosecutors and 
judges and the possible loss of judicial impartiality. A report was presented 
that contained recommendations offered by the European Commission 
regarding the affiliation between judges and prosecutors in their Report of an 
Advisory Visit on The Functioning of the Judicial System in the Republic of 
Turkey 2005.  By viewing this relationship as a form of judicial dependence 
defined by Christopher Larkins, it is clear that the Commission makes a 
strong argument for reform. 
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
“The Minister affirmed with justifiable pride that the Republic from the day 
of its birth had based its foreign relations on respect for law.”1 This quote 
could fit quite nicely into the rhetoric of today’s public debate over judicial 
reforms; however, it was written 63 years ago about the opening ceremony 
for the Turkish Institute of International Law.2 It appears relevant because 
even today the Republic of Turkey is justifying its judiciary to the West. As 
the European Union continues to make recommendations for reform and 
follow-up implementation, the Turkish government’s response continues to 
be in large part justification rather than reform. 
Turkey has had a long relationship with the European Community 
economically and strategically. The current accession process it is engaged 
in dominates all aspects of this relationship. The progress report 
Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006 – 2007 with regard to the 
reforms the country is making has just come out and will be picked over by 
politicians, academics and pundits alike. In the report, it briefly mentions 
the progress –or lack thereof – concerning the judicial system.3 This brevity 
must not be construed as a lack of interest or, on the contrary, a signal that 
there isn’t much left to do. The real focus on the judicial system was put out 
                                                
1 Philip Marshall Brown, “The Turkish Institute of International Law,” The American Journal of International Law  37: 4 
(Oct 1943): 641 
2 Brown, “The Turkish Institute of International Law,” p. 640
3 Commission of European “Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: 
Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007,” COM(2006)649 Brussels 8 November,  pp. 10, 20, 50. 
2in 2005 in the third Report of an Advisory Visit of the Functioning of the 
Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey by Kjell Bjornberg and Ross 
Cranston. This 85-page document focuses on the Commission’s
recommendations that were made to Turkey in the two previous reports in 
addition to making a few new ones that will be discussed later in this paper. 
The reforms this paper will discuss concern the special position prosecutors 
have with judges (listed in Section 3 of the advisory report), how this 
relationship came about and how this affects the judicial independence of 
the system. The analysis that will be used will not be based on using 
identifiers of judicial independence but viewing the relationship between 
Turkish judges and prosecutors explained by the Commission’s report as 
occurrences of judicial dependence as explained by Christopher Larkins. 
Finally, probably most importantly, is a discussion on the resistance of the 
government to address the situation. 
3C h a p t e r  1
Judicial Independence 
In order to begin examining the relationship the Turkish Republic’s 
Prosecutors have with judges and the possible effects this may have on the 
independence of the judiciary, it is important to recognize the type of threat 
this is to judicial independence. However, this is not so easily done because 
there is no ultimately accepted definition of judicial independence.4 It is 
vital to keep in mind that judicial independence should not be viewed as a 
means unto itself, but rather as a tool, principle or value that can bring about 
justice, security and economic growth.5 As with successful and not-so-
successful reforms in Latin America in the 80s and Eastern Europe in the 
90s, it is hoped that reform will bring about stability and a better chance for 
the future.6 This fact may sometimes be overlooked due to the overall 
emphasis on judicial reform for the sake of EU accession, rather than for the 
benefit judicial independence would create. Even the Union itself neglects 
to make a consistently clear case about why judicial reform and 
independence in particular are necessary, especially when viewed in light of 
passages such as this from the recent enlargement progress report that came 
out on November 8, 2006: “There was progress in the area of judicial 
                                                
4 Kate Mallerson, “Judicial Training and Performance Appraisal: The problem of Judicial Independence,” The Modern 
Law Review 60: 5 (September 1997): 657.
5 Terri Peretti, “A Normative Appraisal of Social Scientific Knowledge Regarding Judicial Independence,” Ohio State 
Law Journal 64 (2003), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu./lawjournal/issues/volume64/number1/peretti.pdf p. 1. 
6 Maria Dakolias and Javiar Said, “Judicial Reform: A Progress of Change Through Pilot Courts,” European Journal of 
Law Reform 2: 1 (2000): p. 95.
4reform. However, implementation of the new legislation by the judiciary 
presents a mixed picture so far and the independence of the judiciary needs 
to be further established.”7 However, independence in itself is no guarantee 
of proper decision making on the part of judges or by what measurement 
will it be understood their legal interpretations have improved.
This statement calls for the creation of further judicial independence but 
doesn’t give the rationale behind its importance. It is important to note that 
the EU itself does not have a binding set of legal standards for judicial 
independence.8 They therefore reference many international standards in 
their reports that will be described later in this paper.9
While there is no single universally accepted definition of judicial 
independence, there are patterns that run through the descriptions of judicial 
independence starting with the more general categories of internal 
independence also called normative and external or institutional 
independence.10 From here the definitions branch off into more detailed 
descriptors.  
Although in this paper the definitions of the international standards 
espoused by the European Union and the distinctions made by Christopher 
                                                
7 Commission of European Communities Enlargement Strategy p. 50
8 Open Society Institute, Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Independence (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 2001), p. 27.
9 Open Society, Monitoring the EU Accession, p. 28.
10 John Ferejohn, “Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence,” Southern California 
Law Review 72: 353 (1999): 353. 
5Larkins will be used to examine the recommendations of the Commission 
regarding the uneasily close relationship between the Republic’s 
prosecutors and judges and the responses of the Turkish government; it is 
important to get a wider view of the literature concerning judicial 
independence. The next section will therefore help to put the study of 
judicial independence into a broader framework.  
a) Normative/Internal Independence
Normative independence, according to John Ferejohn, concerns judges 
keeping their personal, ideological opinions out of the decision-making 
process.11 It has also therefore been identified by some scholars as 
decisional independence.12 This refers to the internal professionalism and 
integrity of the judge. The problem here is how it is possible to measure the 
internal workings of a judge’s mind. Systematically evaluating this 
definition of independence seems fraught with the danger of creating 
arbitrary variables that could ultimately lead to character assassinations.  
b) Institutional/External Independence
Institutional independence, on the other hand, refers to the safeguards that 
protect judges from institutions that might wish to sway the court’s 
                                                
11 Ferejohn, “Explaining Judicial Independence,” p. 353
12 Peter Shane, “Interbranch Accountability in State Government and the Constitutional Requirement of Judicial 
Independence,” Law and Contemporary Problems 61: 3 (Summer 1998): 21
6decision.13 Theoretically these safeguards should be designed so that judges 
can adjudicate in a vacuum and act according to the law without worrying
about reprisals.14 The institutions that have vested interests in cases before 
the court are most notably: the executive branch, the legislative branch and,
as we see more and more today, the media.15 Volcansek goes even further to 
list “centers of private power such as corporations, unions or religious 
organizations.”16 As we have seen with recent cases brought under Article 
301 of the Turkish Penal Code, the pressure brought to bear by the media 
and big business may in fact be a road block to external independence but 
not necessarily justice. This brings up an interesting point regarding the 
ability of judges to make accurate decisions even if given internal and 
external independence. 
This concern over the ability of judges to make accurate decisions carries 
over into the accountability of judges who are given external independence. 
This is an ongoing controversy. The question being how much 
independence is too much, and what guarantees do we have that justice is 
protected when judges are truly independent?17 In other words, having no 
accountability for judges leaves open the possibility for judges to abuse 
their position. To counterbalance this there are many forms of checks and 
balances—to use the American term for accountability and oversight—
                                                
13Ferejohn, “Explaining Judicial Independence,” p. 353.
14 Ferejohn, “Explaining Judicial Independence,” p. 354.
15 Mallerson, “Judicial Training and Performance Appraisal,” p. 657.
16 Mary L. Volcansek, Constitutional Politics In Italy (New York City: Palgave Publishers, 1999), p. 7.
17 David P. Currie, “Separating Judicial Power,” Law and Contemporary Problems 61: 3 (Summer 1998): 10.
7ranging from professional judicial boards that oversee the activities of 
judges and public prosecutors to the practice of hiring judges, which may 
also work as a de facto form of preventing overly ideological jurists from 
ascending to the bench. But ultimately, judicial independence has been seen 
as a far more valuable goal than accountability simply because 
accountability can often times be just another form of judicial control by 
competing with governmental actors. The accountability of judges,
however, is not the focus of this paper, and the recommendations of the 
Commission in regards to reforming the High Council to deal with these 
concerns is another area that requires further study.   
c) Further Divisions of Judicial Independence
Now that we have seen the general perspective of judicial independence 
from the internal to external, it is important to get more into the specifics of 
each of these categories. In most cases, judicial independence is viewed as a 
whole broken into various pieces not relating to external or internal facets 
but merely facets of the one judicial independence. For example, Shabbir 
Cheema when examining the governmental reform in developing countries 
breaks it down into four parts, beginning with political autonomy, which 
quite clearly refers to external independence, in which the decisions of the 
judiciary are not influenced by politics.18 He goes on to describe 
                                                
18 Shabbir G. Cheema, Building Democratic Institutions: Governance Reform in Developing Countries (Bloomfield: Kumarian 
Press, 2005), p. 173.
8“detachment” from the parties before them.19 This looks like internal 
independence prima facie but here Cheema also talks about “insularity,” 
which we can take to mean a kind of buffering from these parties who are 
brought before the judge.20 The buffers could include divesting in any 
stocks in companies with similar interests to one or both of the parties.21
This type of independence is clearly external in its “detachment”. While 
judicial ethics appears to be irrelevant for judicial independence per se it is 
important when taking into account the public’s perception of judicial 
independence from outside actors such as corporations. 
The third is withdrawal from specific ideologies so that decisions can be 
made “impartially”.22 Unlike the previous two definitions, this one deals 
with internal independence, here only the judges themselves can withdraw 
from ideological activity, and it would be impossible to check what is going 
on in the minds of judges who wish to hide their political or religious biases
from society. This is yet another problem with trying to hold jurists 
accountable before they have rendered their decisions. But after they have 
done so and supported their decisions with reasoned legal arguments, how 
can they then be reprimanded without the appearance of interfering with the 
independence of the judiciary? 
                                                
19 Cheema, Building Democratic Institutions, p. 173.
20 Cheema, Building Democratic Institutions, p. 173.
21 Shimon Shetreet, “The Challenge of Judicial Independence in the Twenty-First Century,” Asia Pacific Law Review 8: 
2 (2000): 156. 
22 Cheema, Building Democratic Institutions, p. 173.
9The fourth factor in judicial independence under Cheema’s definition is 
keeping public pressure from the media out of the judge’s decision 
making.23 When issues or crimes before the court are especially 
controversial and/or sensational the media can reflect the mood of the public 
which may not be interested in justice or law but in protecting their own 
values and interests. In this case, one can’t help but think of the recent cases 
involving Orhan Pamuk and Elif Safak (which pertain to both brought 
before the court under Article 301) for denigrating the Turkish national 
identity.24 The media storm brought about by these cases drew international 
attention and no doubt brought pressure on the government to change the 
law (which it hasn’t)  but what can’t be measured is the effect this had on 
the decision of the court to dismiss both cases out right. In a democratic 
society the need for the public to know what the judiciary is doing is 
important as transparency leads to trust. Cheema would ask does that need 
for transparency outweigh the risk of unduly influencing judges and 
sacrificing any chance of a fair trial. Because it seems whether you were in 
support of or against these writers what ever the decision, one side will 
blame the media for influencing the decision and thereby the judiciary is 
undermined. 
                                                
23 Cheema, Building Democratic Institutions, p. 173.
24 There are a myriad of translations of Article 301 from Turkish into English, the most common one being “insult 
to Turkishness” however I find the translation I have used in this paper by Mark Petrovich more adequately 
depicts the perceived offenses by the two writers. This translation also mirrors the translation of other similar laws 
in other countries.  
10
The Turkish Penal Code works to deter this influence under Article 288 by
stipulating that a person makes an oral or written comment attempting to 
affect the prosecutor, judge, court, legal expert, and or witnesses in a 
pending investigation or prosecution is going to be punished with a prison
sentence from six months to three years. If this offense is committed 
through the press or media, the penalty to be imposed shall be increased by 
half. According to advocate Fikret İlkiz, “Currently there are lots of open 
cases against them (journalists) for “attempting to affect” the fair trial in 
pending cases.”25
Whether the decisions in these high profile cases were influenced by the 
media or not isn’t the real concern for judicial independence; it is the 
appearance of dependence seen by the public which undermines the 
legitimacy of the courts, which in turn tarnishes one of the values judicial 
independence strives for, namely, public confidence in the courts. 26  
While Cheema’s categories of judicial independence are illuminating, they 
leave out the important responsibility of the judicial system: the ability to 
mediate between competing branches of government.  Although he does 
refer to “the institutional mechanisms to hold accountable those in 
power,”27 that seems more to do with citizens using the courts as recourse 
than the institutional position within the governmental system. It therefore 
                                                
25 Fikret İlkiz, BİA Haber. www.bianet.org/2006/05/29/79684.htm
26 Shetreet, “The Challenge of Judicial Independence in the Twenty-First Century,” p. 154.
27 Cheema, Building Democratic Institutions, p. 174.
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appears prudent to examine another scholar’s judicial independence 
breakdown. 
d) Larkins’ Categorical Analysis
Rather than focusing purely on the judges’ role in judicial independence the 
role of the judiciary as an institution must also be taken into the 
independence equation. Christopher Larkins uses three categories to 
examine judicial independence in the American judicial system. The first he 
calls “insularity”28 which is focused on “institutional safeguards” to protect 
judges, such as life tenure, checks and balances in appointments, and 
preventing their salaries from being decreased as reprisals for unfavorable 
decisions to the government. 29 This quite clearly refers to external 
independence and, like Cheema; he focuses on the judges’ protection. 
The second category is “impartiality,” in which the judge has no bias toward 
the issues of the case or any relationship or favoritism toward any of the 
parties involved in the case.30  This honest referee image of the judge is 
consistent with internal independence and again is judge centered. 
The third category is where Larkins departs from other definitions of 
judicial independence. Here he identifies “scope of authority,” which looks 
at the place the court has in the overall political system and how it works 
                                                
28 Christopher M. Larkins, “Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis,” 
The American Journal of Comparative Law 44: 4 (Autumn 1996): p. 609.
29 Larkins, “Judicial Independence and Democratization,” p. 609.
30 Larkins, “Judicial Independence and Democratization,” p. 608.
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with the other branches of government.31 Here Larkins is still working in 
the framework of external independence but he is no longer concerned with 
individual judges. Instead he wishes to point out the need for a powerful 
judiciary, “which has the power as an institution to regulate the legality of 
governmental behavior…”32
Larkins’ “scope of authority” is not a major concern for the Commission as 
they only gave three recommendations in this regard.33 This is not 
surprising since Turkey has had a functioning judiciary based on the 
European model for more than eighty years and the relationship between the 
branches of government are clearly differentiated in the Constitution.
It is imperative to discuss scope of authority because as Larkins offers a 
more practical explanation of judicial independence it requires an
interconnectedness of impartiality, insularity and scope of authority. When 
there is an insufficient level of insularity for judges, all the scope of 
authority in the world will not prevent that individual judge from being 
reprimanded unofficially by a pay downgrade or removal from the bench.34
In Turkey’s case, being “promoted” to an undesirable area of the country is 
another form of intimidation that the Ministry of Justice can place on an 
                                                
31 Larkins, “Judicial Independence and Democratization,” p. 611.
32 Larkins, “Judicial Independence and Democratization,” p. 611.
33 Kjell Bjorberg and Ross Cranston European Commission, The Functioning of the Judicial System in the Republic of 
Turkey: Report of an Advisory Visit 13 June – 22 June 2005 pp. 69-71.
34 Larkins, “Judicial Independence and Democratization,” p. 614.
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individual judge.35 While scope of authority isn’t going to be an important 
component in the analysis of section 3 of the advisory report it is important 
to understand because Larkins illuminates these elements of judicial 
independence which correspond quite neatly to the types of reform 
suggested by the Commission. They comprise internal and external 
independence as well as the distinction between independence of judicial 
actors and the judicial system. This, therefore, will be the model definition 
that this paper will use to analyze the Commission’s recommendations.  
It must be kept in mind, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, that 
the Commission is using a collection of international principles for their 
descriptions of judicial independence. The EU doesn’t have its own 
standards for judicial independence. The United Nations Office of the High 
Commission for Human Rights came up with a list of 20 points in 1985 that 
were necessary to create an independent judiciary which in turn increases 
the human rights record of a country.36 However, this is a list of 
components that a judiciary needs to be independent but gives no way to 
measure the level of any of the points listed. These principles help form 
what the EU considers to be “best European practices” for the judiciary.37
These principles can best be described as a check list of what the 
government and the judiciary should and should not be able to do. Rather 
                                                
35 Idil Elveriş, “Judicial Transfers and Judicial Independent in Turkey,” Istanbul Bar Journal: V.78 pp. 409-33.
36 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary,” 
Resolution 40/146 (13 December 1985).
37 Bjornberg and Cranston, Report of an Advisory Visit, p.6.
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than offering a definition of judicial independence, which could create 
difficulty, the UN created a list of descriptors that leave less to 
interpretation. The descriptors, although described in the document as all 
involving independence of the judiciary, are nonetheless grouped into five 
subheadings with independence of the judiciary as one such heading.38 Like 
scholars, the UN principles have lumped descriptions into broad categories 
but have separated specific descriptors of independence as if the other 
subheadings—Freedom of Expression and Association, Qualifications, 
Selection and Training, Conditions of Service and Tenure and Discipline, 
Suspension and Removal—are not specific to independence of the judiciary. 
But in reality, this incongruence is only a matter of word choice. In 
paragraph 10 of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary,
they use the term “Independence of the judiciary” to define the judicial 
independence and then use the same terminology as the first subheading 
although the first four principles listed fit quite clearly under “insularity”. 
These divisions shed no more light on the meaning of these principles or on
judicial independence, since they correspond neatly to internal and external 
independence under Ferejohn as well as impartiality, insularity and scope of 
authority under Larkins. It is therefore unnecessary to list all the principles 
out in this paper. 
Along with the UN Basic Principles, the Commission is also using the 
Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct 2002 as a model of how judges 
                                                
38 High Commissioner for Human Rights, Basic Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary, p.1 par. 10.
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should act inside and outside the courtroom.39 Because this paper will focus 
on the relationship and conduct between the prosecutor and judge, it is an 
essential component for the Commission and this paper. It must be noted 
here that the Bangalore criteria does not mix independence with 
impartiality. These are viewed as separate and distinct values needed to 
ensure a “proper discharge of the judicial office.”40 Also included as a 
separate value from independence in the Bangalore Principles is integrity, it
states that “a judge shall ensure that his or her conduct is above reproach in 
the view of a reasonable observer.”41 It goes on to say “Justice must not 
merely be done but must also be seen to be done”42 This is a critical point 
that will become apparent later in this paper when examining the 
relationship between the judges and prosecutors. The possible observations 
from reasonable persons are the rationale of the Commissions 
recommendations; in this paper, it is being argued that they are observing 
what Larkins has called judicial dependence.43 The recommendations made 
by the Commission can best be evaluated as instances of possible judicial 
dependence. Judicial dependence, however, must first be defined. 
                                                
39 Open Society, Monitoring the EU Accession, p. 29.
40 The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct 2002 value 2 p. 3
41 The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct 2002 value 3-3.1 p. 4
42 The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct 2002 value 3-3.2 p. 4
43 Larkins, “Judicial Independence and Democratization,” p. 618
16
2. Judicial Dependence
From the understanding of the definitions of judicial independence cited 
above, the next step is to apply it to a system to check the level of judicial 
independence in the Turkish judicial system. However, as Larkins points 
out, this task is more complicated than one might expect and, in fact, true 
judicial independence is an abstraction.44 If this is the case, then finding 
empirical evidence of judicial independence is just as problematic. For 
example, if we want to check that a judge is not biased by looking at his or 
her past decisions, we fall into the trap of assuming there must be a pattern.
However, the fact is, each case will be different and therefore skew any 
interpretation of the data collected.45 It is therefore Larkins’s contention that 
scholars should be looking for examples of “dependence” in the system.46
Rather than trying to categorize the level of judicial independence in a 
country the real work is in identifying where judges and/or the judicial 
system is dependent on other actors and/or governmental and public 
systems. Because EU politics refrains from overtly measuring judicial 
independence or placing a value judgment on another country’s judiciary,
the judicial dependence approach fits well into the recommendation scheme. 
It is this more practical approach that the Commission has taken in 
assessing the Turkish judicial system. So as we look at the 
recommendations themselves by the Commission in the chapter to come,
                                                
44 Larkins, “Judicial Independence and Democratization,” p. 618
45 Larkins, “Judicial Independence and Democratization,” p. 616
46 Larkins, “Judicial Independence and Democratization,” p. 618
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we should see them in the light of judicial dependence. We should also note
how these examples affect “insularity”, “impartiality” or “scope of 
authority”.  But first it is important to become familiar with the 
development of the public prosecutor in Turkey to better understand the 
historical and cultural context in which they have evolved. This may also 
illuminate the government’s response to the Commission’s proposed 
reforms.
3. Historical Development of the Role of Prosecutors in Turkey
Prosecutors first appeared in France in 1303 because of the judicial
dysfunction as a result of justice based on the aggrieved parties seeking 
personal revenge against the alleged perpetrators. The Parliament passed a 
decree on March 25th 1303 asking for the King to establish a prosecutor to 
take on the duty to prosecute criminals on behalf of the King rather than the 
victims.47 These prosecutors were established by King Philippe Le Bel and 
called the King’s Prosecutors.48 Their duties were defined in the French 
procedure code of 1808 which then influenced the German criminal 
procedure code of 1877.49 Unlike judges, the prosecutor is charged with the 
duty of protecting the public’s rights, but they can not judge criminality.
Instead, they only accept complaints and then choose to open a case or 
                                                
47 Prof. Dr. Durmuş Tezcan, “I. Fransa’da Savcılık,” Bir Adli Organ Olarak Savcılık (Ankara: Türkiye Barolar Birliği 
Birinci Baskı, 2006) p. 35. 
48 Tezcan, I. Fransa’da Savcılık, p. 34.
49 Prof. Dr. Bahri Öztürk, Yrd. Doç. Dr. Mustafa Ruhan Erdem and Yrd. Doç. Dr. Veli Ozer Özbek, Uygulamalı
Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku (Ankara: Seçkin Yayıncılık San. ve Tic. A.Ş., 2002), p. 38.
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not.50 They are generally in charge of directing the investigation into the 
filed complaint.51
The role of the Republic’s prosecutor did not exist under the Islamic legal 
system (also referred to as sharia law) and therefore prosecutors weren’t 
seen in the Ottoman legal system.52 Under Islamic law, judges presided over 
both public and private legal matters.53 The kadı (judge) called the accused 
before the court as well as decide the case before them. There was no 
procedure code, so the courts didn’t run uniformly throughout the empire. 
The first procedure code was introduced in Turkey under late Ottoman rule 
in 1879, which was based on the French code of 1808.54 The code was 
called Usul_ü Muhakemat_ı Cezaiye Kanunu.55 It was at this time that the 
Ottomans introduced prosecutors into their system as they adopted other 
parts of the French system.56
That code was later replaced in Turkish law during the five years of legal 
reform after the founding of the Turkish Republic.57 It was at this time that
the reforms were based on codes from different European countries: the 
civil code was based on the Swiss; criminal code on the Italians; the 
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commercial code was imported from Germany and Italy.58 The civil 
procedure code came from Neuf Chatel (Switzerland).59 However, due to 
the complexity of the Italian criminal procedure code, it was decided that 
the German model would work better.60 It was the 1877 German criminal 
procedure code, which was adopted in 1929, that created a permanent 
prosecutor position in Turkey’s judicial system.61 Therefore the practical 
activities of the court regarding the interplay between judges, prosecutors, 
and defense attorneys are based on the German model, which, in turn, has 
French influences. Of course there have been a number of reforms 
throughout the history of the modern Turkish legal system.62 However,
there is still a visible congruency between the two systems, which we will 
discuss in the next chapter.
For modern lawyers, The Council of Europe has set recommendations for 
prosecutorial powers given to public prosecutors in order to unify the 
European system of law because of the increased transnational nature of 
cases within Europe.63 That document discusses the responsibilities and 
powers that should be given to prosecutors and therefore should be 
discussed as best practices in relation to the Commission’s Advisory Report 
                                                
58 Hilal Inalcık, “Turkey between Europe and the Middle East,” Perceptions Journal of International Affairs 3: 1 (March –
May 1998) 
59 Van Olden, “Legal Development Cooperation,” p. 6.
60 Öztürk, Ceza Muhakemesi, p. 38.
61 Öztürk, Ceza Muhakemesi, p. 38.
62 Öztürk, Ceza Muhakemesi, p. 38. 
63 Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1604 (2003) para. 4. 
20
not discussed in this paper under section four Role and Effectiveness of 
Public Prosecutors along with EU recommendation 19(2000).
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C h a p t e r  2
Commission Recommendations
In order to help Turkey emerge as a viable candidate for accession into the 
European Union, the judiciary not only needs reform, also, according to the 
Commission’s latest report specifically on the subject, The Functioning of 
the Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey Report of an Advisory Visit -
- 13 June – 22 June 2005, a serious overhaul. The report contains 48 
recommendations, which encompass 5 areas of the judicial system. Section 
2 of the report refers to Judicial Independence and the Role of the Ministry 
of Justice, which deals primarily with establishing insularity between judges 
and the Ministry of Justice as well as some areas of human rights and 
justice.64 Section 4 covers the Role and Effectiveness of Public Prosecutors,
which covers the professional responsibilities of prosecutors with regard to 
prosecutorial discretion and the Ministry of Justice oversight.65 Section 5 
regards the Role of Effectiveness of Lawyers. This chapter looks at the 
equality of arms between prosecutors and defense attorneys as well as the 
power of the Ministry to intimidate defense attorneys and the relationship 
between the defense lawyers and their clients.66 The final substantive 
section, 6, is Quality and Efficiency of the Justice System Human Rights 
Related Issues, wherein the Commission discusses the repercussions of 
                                                
64 Bjornberg and Cranston, Report of an Advisory Visit, p. 8-16.
65 Bjornberg and Cranston, Report of an Advisory Visit, p. 24-27.
66 Bjornberg and Cranston, Report of an Advisory Visit, p. 29-40.
22
inefficient judicial mechanisms that cause problems of back-log, budget, 
organization of courts and other administrational reforms.67 Each of these 
sections needs further study to determine its impact and unique character in 
regard to the Turkish judicial system. This paper however is only concerned
with one section of the report and its impact on judicial independence and,
therefore, on the justice and the stability of the country. 
1. Affiliation Between Judges and Prosecutors Recommendations
Section 3 of the Advisory Report: Affiliation Between Judges and 
Prosecutors recommends significant changes to the position and training of 
the prosecutors and judges in relation to one another.68
Here the Commission has done similar work on the Turkish judiciary as 
Larkins did in his South American studies. It is being argued in this paper 
that the relationship between the Republic’s Prosecutors and judges 
highlighted in this section of the Commission’s report are all instances of 
judicial dependence and constitute a threat to justice because the 
prosecutors give the appearance of undue influence to sway judicial 
decisions.
Courtroom logistics plays a surprisingly significant role in the relationship 
between the prosecutor and judge. It should be kept in mind that this 
particular report makes it clear that it is not a single recommendation or, as 
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this paper stipulates, a single identifier of judicial dependence, but the 
accumulation of all these situations that create the impediments to judicial 
independence.69 Adding together all the situations discussed below a picture 
emerges of two separate distinct professional roles that have far too many 
points of common connection to leave the public with a sense that there is 
no undue influence on the decision-making process in the Turkish judicial 
system. Again it must be reiterated that the report makes no claim that these 
two offices are not in fact independent; it only points to the possibility of 
appearance.70 But that is enough to create distrust in the system. Generally, 
this does not happen when things are running smoothly, but when there is 
controversy these points of connectivity raise suspicion.71
It is probably best to go over the recommendations set out in Section 3 
before proceeding into any more detail about their effect on judicial 
independence. In this section there are six recommendations, dealing with 
the relationship between prosecutors and judges, starting with a 
constitutional amendment to separate the rights and responsibilities of 
prosecutors and judges.72
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a) Judges, Prosecutors and the Turkish Constitution
“Aiming for best practice on an independent judiciary, we recommend that        
the Constitution be amended so as to provide for an institutional and 
functional separation of the professional rights and duties of judges and 
public prosecutors.”73
The current constitution in Part Three, Chapter Three, Section C. Judges 
and Public Prosecutors, ARTICLE 140 reads: 74
 “Judges and public prosecutors shall serve as judges and public 
prosecutors of courts of justice and of administrative courts. These duties 
shall be carried out by professional judges and public prosecutors.” 
“Judges shall discharge their duties in accordance with the principles of the 
independence of the courts and the security of tenure of judges.” 
“The qualifications, appointments, rights and duties, salaries and allowances 
of judges and public prosecutors, their promotion, temporary or permanent 
change in their duties or posts, the initiation of disciplinary proceedings 
against them and the subsequent imposition of disciplinary penalties, the 
conduct of investigation concerning them and the subsequent decision to 
prosecute them on account of offenses committed in connection with, or in 
the course of, their duties, the conviction for offenses or instances of 
incompetence requiring their dismissal from the profession, their in-service 
training and other matters relating to their personnel status shall be 
regulated by law in accordance with the principles of independence of the 
courts and the security of tenure of judges.” 
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“Judges and public prosecutors shall exercise their duties until they reach 
the age of sixty-five; promotion according to age and the retirement of 
military judges shall be prescribed by law.”  
“Judges and public prosecutors shall not assume official or public functions 
other than those prescribed by law.”
“Judges and public prosecutors shall be attached to the Ministry of Justice 
where their administrative functions are concerned.”
“Those judges and public prosecutors working in administrative posts 
within the system of legal services shall be subject to the same provisions as 
other judges and public prosecutors. Their categories and grades shall be 
determined according to the principles applying to judges and public 
prosecutors and they shall enjoy all the rights accorded to judges and public 
prosecutors.” 
As can be seen, each section of the article starts with “judges and public 
prosecutors”. It is therefore clear in this constitutional article that judges and 
prosecutors are linked together on a professional level and appear to be 
equal members within the court. This as suggested by the report can give 
the appearance of a more dominant position over the defense attorneys in 
the judicial system and therefore gives the image of an unfair advantage and 
should be amended. It hasn’t always been this way. In the 1961 Constitution 
under Article 137 the prosecutor’s duties were enumerated, however judges 
were listed separately starting with Article 132.75 It wasn’t until after the 
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coup in 1980 and the Constitution of 1982 that the judge’s duties were 
added to the prosecutor’s article together under Article 140. 
The transformation of The Supreme Council of Judges (which was created 
by the 1961 constitution) into The High Judges and Prosecutors High 
Council in 1981 which placed the Minister of Justice and the Deputy of the 
Minister of Justice on this judicial board76 with duties to choose the appeal 
court members, admission to profession, assignments, disciplinary 
punishments and dismissal77 make it clear that the military junta was 
creating tighter control over the judiciary by the executive branch. The High 
Council is yet another infringement on judicial insularity and adds yet 
another example of judicial dependence, since there are members of the 
Ministry of Justice on the Council and therefore has influence on the 
judges’ performance appraisals and working environment. This is a clear 
example of a violation of insularity under Larkins’ definition. This is 
covered in section 2 of the advisory report under Independence of the 
Judiciary.78 The reason it is included in this paper (which is focused on 
section 3 of the advisory report) is that the relationship between prosecutors 
and judges are professionally linked in this Council and it therefore forms 
one more link in the judicial dependence chain.
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The Commission seems to be asking the Turkish government to separate the 
two positions and to identify them as distinct roles within the judiciary, as 
they were in the 1961 Constitution, which should have separate 
mechanisms, for professional training, pay and promotion. The government 
has resisted any call for a constitutional change in this regard with the usual 
argument that this is not uncommon in other European Union member 
states’ constitutions.79  
b) Re-assignment of prosecutors between courts
“We note the positive information given that Public prosecutors should be 
reassigned to different courtrooms on a regular basis. However, referring to 
the information we obtained we recommend that this objective is fully 
implemented.”80
The next recommendation in section three is to rotate the public prosecutors 
between courts so they don’t work with the same judges on a continuous 
basis.81 This situation can most obviously be an example of judicial 
dependence in which a prosecutor may spend years working alongside a 
judge and create a relationship that interferes with the “insularity” of the 
judge’s decision-making. 
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c) Separation of Judges’ and Prosecutors’ Offices
“We recommend that Public prosecutors either be required to have their 
offices outside of the courthouse or, if this is not practicable, then public 
prosecutors have their offices located in a completely separate part of the 
courthouse from that occupied by judges.”82
The proximity of the judge’s and prosecutor’s offices is another point of 
contention that the Commission believes shows the possibility of undue 
influence on judges by prosecutors. They recommend that the prosecutors’ 
offices be moved to another building, separate from judges, and, if that isn’t 
possible, then to move them as far away from the judges’ offices as 
possible.83 The work of prosecutors and judges is fundamentally different 
with respect to different actors in society. It would seem plausible then that 
their working environments should reflect that difference. 
d) Equality of Arms
“We recommend that measures be taken to ensure equality between 
prosecution and defense counsel during the course of criminal proceedings. 
We emphasize the importance of measures to be taken to make defense 
lawyers fully in position to assure their responsibilities on the subject. We 
underline the importance of a full implementation of the new regulation 
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enabling defense lawyers to cross-examine and recommend action to be 
taken to ensure that this is done.”84
The traditional view of prosecutors in Turkey, according to Turgut Kazan,
the former president of the Istanbul Bar Association, is that they act as 
partial participants in their cases.85 The defense attorney is on one side, and 
the prosecutor is on the opposite side representing the public and is
therefore not an impartial actor.86 Therefore, defense attorneys can not ask 
that a prosecutor remove him or herself from a case due to bias because it is 
expected that they are biased.87 Mr. Kazan challenges this traditional view 
by pointing out a number of paragraphs from the Budapest Guidelines for 
prosecutors.88 Under these guidelines, the prosecutor is obligated to seek 
justice as an impartial participant investigating complaints for both 
incriminating and exculpatory evidence; if the prosecutor believes at any
time the defendant is innocent, the trial can be stopped immediately.89
Kazan points out that if the prosecutor acts as the harmed party in the case 
due to the power of their position and relationship with the judge (which 
will be discussed in this chapter) there can be no equality of arms.90   
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e) Judges and Prosecutors entering and leaving Courtrooms
“We recommend that public prosecutors be required to enter and leave the 
courtroom through a door other than that used by the judge. We believe 
that this could be implemented at least to some extent also in existing 
courtrooms. “91
The next two recommendations involve an interesting connection between 
the physical design of Turkish courtrooms and the appearance of judicial 
dependence. In these recommendations, the Commission wishes to end the 
practice of judges and prosecutors entering the courtroom through the same 
door together before a hearing, exiting together during recesses and at the 
end of a hearing.92 In addition to this, the Commission also requests that the 
prosecutor and defense lawyer be seated at the same level in the 
courtroom.93
f) The position in Court-rooms of Prosecutors and defense Lawyers
“We recommend that public prosecutors and defense lawyers be positioned 
on an equal level in court rooms; preferably with both of them sitting at 
ground level opposite to each other. We believe that this could be 
implemented at least to some extent also in existing court-rooms. “94
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 To many who are familiar with popularized scenes of courtroom dramas 
where the prosecutor and defense attorney face off against one another 
before an impartial judge as referee perched high above the fray, the reality 
of a Turkish courtroom is a sobering experience. The public prosecutor sits 
next to the judge on the bench where they both face the accused and their 
lawyer from an elevated platform. It is this position that the Commission 
wishes to be changed. Because of this staging of the courtroom actors, the 
prosecutor is compelled to enter by the same door as the judge because they 
to are sitting behind the bench together. It is not uncommon to see the 
prosecutor, who sits silent throughout the trial, lean over and whisper in the 
judge’s ear during the proceedings. The prosecutor appears more like the 
judges assistant than an independent actor of justice.95 In fact, in an 
infamous Turkish case called Bariş Davası (The Peace Case), during an 
objection to the application of a law, the judge clarified the position of the 
prosecutor by stating that they belong to the court.96 The message here can 
be interpreted as a solidification of the traditional perception of the public 
and legal community that the prosecutor is an agent of the judge and not a 
separate independent actor within the judicial system.97  To refer back to 
the previous recommendation on equality of arms, there can be no equality 
of arms in any form when there exists a relationship like this between the 
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prosecutor and judges. Furthermore, it damages the appearance of 
impartiality in the justice system.98  
The roots of the prosecutor’s position next to the judge are not common-
knowledge and therefore are accompanied by an urban legend. When 
Turgut Kazan was asked for this paper why prosecutors are seated next to 
judges on the bench, he related a story common among lawyers and 
subsequently confirmed in numerous newspaper accounts.99 The story goes, 
a disrespectful prosecutor was talking to a judge as an equal behind the 
bench, when the judge said, “You think we are equal because we are sitting 
together here, do you know why you are sitting next to me?” At which point 
the prosecutor didn’t have an answer and the judge promptly replied, 
“Because of a carpenter’s mistake!”100 The questions that follow are 
numerous, for instance: why would a carpenter think that the prosecutor sits 
next to the judge? Weren’t there any blueprints to follow when building the 
courtrooms? Who did design the courtrooms for the new republic? The 
answers to some of these questions have been lost in the sands of time, but 
there are extrapolations that can offer some guidance.
Since the Turkish Republic adopted the German criminal procedure code,
which was influenced by the same French code previously employed by the 
Ottomans, it stands to reason they would adopt the designs not only of the 
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procedures but also the physicality of the French and German system. Even 
today in France and Germany, prosecutors are seated next to the judges in 
courtrooms that were built before their systems were reformed.101 Though 
this is no longer the norm in Germany’s new courthouses, it continues in 
small courtrooms in small towns such as Kirchhain, which some Germans 
find strange.102 In German courtrooms, the judge and prosecutor are 
separated by a gap of 75 centimeters, which is uniform in all courtrooms 
that still have prosecutors seated next to judges.103 Although there is no 
regulation that stipulates the design of the criminal courtrooms there is 
uniformity none the less.104 However, the prosecutor does not enter the 
courtroom through the same door as the judge. In fact, it is clearly stipulated 
in German Guidelines for Criminal Procedure issued by the Ministry of
Justice that “the prosecutor shall avoid anything that can give the 
impression of an improper influence of the court, thus shall not enter or 
leave the courtroom together with the judge/s, neither shall he or she enter 
the jury room or talk to members of the court during breaks.”105 The 
implication here is that by making such a procedure, this very action could 
have been the norm in the past. If prosecutors sit next to judges it seems 
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possible that they could have entered the courtroom through the same door 
as they do in Turkey. 
 It appears there was a linear move of the physical position of the prosecutor 
in relation to the judge from French procedure code to German, which both 
influenced Turkey; not only in criminal procedure but in courtroom design. 
This, however, is extrapolation as there was no documentation found to 
explicitly describe the rationale for the Turkish design of its courts. Since 
the prosecutor was introduced in late Ottoman judicial history by the French 
Code, it may also be inferred that the prosecutor’s current position could 
have originated from the courtroom design of either the French procedure 
code of 1808 which was used in 1879 or the German Procedure Code of 
1877 adopted in 1929.  
g) Prosecutors retiring together with Judges
“We recommend that whenever judges retire to their ante-chamber for the 
purpose of deliberating on their rulings, the public prosecutor be required to 
remain inside the courtroom. Where judges remain in the courtroom in 
order to conduct their deliberation, the prosecutor should not enter into any 
discussion with the judges during the course of their deliberation.”106
The final recommendation of the Commission concerning the affiliation of 
prosecutors and judges requires the prosecutor to stay in the courtroom with 
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the defense attorney when the judge retires to his/her chamber for 
deliberation.107 As it stands now, when the judge leaves the courtroom, the 
prosecutor accompanies them. The Commission goes on to recommend that,
when the judges deliberate in the courtroom, the prosecutor doesn’t speak 
with the judge at that time.108 It is a common belief that practice for the 
judge to empty the courtroom so that he or she can deliberate with the 
prosecution. 
It is interesting to note that in an appeals decision from the Hukuk Genel 
Kurulu made the same month as the Commission’s advisory visit (that is the 
basis for the recommendations this paper is discussing) the court decided to 
reject an appeal. The appeal was based on the argument that because the 
prosecutor was in the room when the judges were deliberating on the
decision (whether to accept the motion to refuse one of the judges) that 
decision should be overturned. The rational used by the court to deny the 
appeal was that because of the design of the court building the three judges 
and the prosecutor are together, but that that didn’t mean the prosecutor was 
speaking with the judges during their deliberation.109 What is interesting 
here is we can understand then that if the Republic’s Prosecutor does speak 
to the judges during a deliberation in which they are the only one allowed in 
the room then this does violate the right of the accused to a fair trial. This is 
another example of Larkins’ insularity definition. The judges understand 
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that for prosecutors to speak to them during deliberations would present the 
Ministry of Justice with an unfair advantage of the judge. The legal 
loophole here appears to be that in the Criminal Procedure Code Article 227 
it states that only judges who are deliberating the final decision can be in the 
courtroom. Since this appeals case was based on a decision concerning an 
interim matter this code doesn’t apply. It gives the impression that all the 
interim decisions that judges make on all motions presented to them in the 
run up to the final decision don’t affect the rights of the accused to a fair 
trial and therefore the prosecutor can be present in the courtroom when the 
judges are making their decisions as long as he/she doesn’t talk. But since 
there are no cameras in the courtroom while judges are deliberating it is 
nearly impossible to know whether a prosecutor is indeed consulting with
the judges and/or the judges are allowing them to do so and therefore 
denying the accused a fair trial. Because the prosecutor is under direction of 
the Ministry of Justice, their stay in the courtroom with deliberating judges 
is clearly a lack of insularity from the appearance of governmental pressure. 
This can only exacerbate the public perception that this relationship creates 
an undue influence on judges’ decision making process. The Commission 
clearly doesn’t make a strong enough case against this type of judicial 
dependence. 
The close relationship between prosecutors and judges that appears to be 
institutionalized in the Turkish constitution and the criminal procedure code 
can be further illustrated with examples like the courthouse in Izmir where a 
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newspaper account from Milliyet describes the cafeteria as segregated.110
The picture accompanying the article shows a sign hung above a door that 
reads Hakim ve Savcı Salon (Judges and Prosecutors Salon). There is a wall 
that divides the judges and prosecutors from the rest of the legal 
community.111 There they can sit and eat together in continuation of 
everything else they do together in the courthouse. Besides work within the 
courthouse judges and prosecutors share lodging provided by the 
government. Since Turkey pays its public servants poorly they generally 
provide housing as part of their benefits. In this case, judges and prosecutors 
share the same housing complexes that the government provides. This 
however was overlooked by the Commission in its report. The point here is 
that although the judges and prosecutors may not be discussing cases or 
clients, it is the appearance of judges and prosecutors living together, eating 
together apart from everyone else that epitomizes a negative public 
perception of undue influence by prosecutors on judicial decision making,
therefore making a breach of judicial independence.   
The existence of such a relationship between a judge and a prosecutor 
causes dangerous results.112 It seems improbable that a judge can not be 
affected by such a system. One example is the request of prosecutors to 
deny the defense access their clients’ case file. Such a request goes through 
the judge for approval and with their close relationship they are more likely 
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to grant such a request.113 This is the view of Mr. Kazan, which shows 
distinctly how this relationship casts doubt on the independence and 
therefore expectation of justice from the Turkish judicial system. 
As the Commission quite clearly points out, it is not any one of the 
recommendations listed above that prevents judicial independence. If we 
apply Larkins’ approach, these are clear examples of judicial dependence 
and, taken as a whole, the very existence of these judicial dependent factors 
makes a strong case for a lack of judicial independence in the Turkish 
judicial system and is therefore a detriment to accession.
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C h a p t e r  3
Government Response to Recommendations
The Turkish government’s response to Chapter 23 Judicial and 
Fundamental Rights of the accession process has been both enthusiastic and 
retractile. The main argument used by the Turkish government for not 
changing Article 140 to separate the location of duties of judges and 
prosecutors within the constitution as recommended has been that other EU 
member countries have similar constitutional articles and therefore is not 
necessary to go through the difficulty of the constitutional amendment 
process.114 The Commission continues to stand by the recommendation,
and, on the face of it, the Turkish government makes a solid argument in 
comparing its own system to that of other EU members. The Commission 
however rebuffs all arguments based on comparative analysis of other 
member countries. It is their aim to set the best practices stipulated in 
documents like the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary, and the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct along with 
Council of Europe recommendations such as the European Guidelines on 
Ethics and Conduct for Public Prosecutors known as “The Budapest 
Guidelines”, which was adopted one month before the last advisory visit to 
Turkey took place. The Budapest Guidelines were influenced by the 
Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation (2002) 19 on the role of public 
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prosecution in the criminal justice system.115 It is important to consider 
these documents when assessing the reforms requested by the Commission 
and implemented by the Turkish government. It doesn’t appear that the 
Commission is attempting to hold the Turkish judiciary up to a European 
standard but rather a best practices standard that is much more difficult to 
achieve.
 In the second Advisory report released in 2004, training was a major issue 
for both judges and prosecutors and took up the majority of the document. 
The Turkish authorities began a vigorous project to create the Justice 
Academy to better train judges and prosecutors. One such project was called 
Judicial Modernisation and Penal Reform in Turkey. The Justice Academy 
is to provide pre-service and on the job training for judges and 
prosecutors.116 The project sent a number of Academy staff to visit other 
justice training centers in France, the Netherlands and Greece.117 In May 
2005 a group of instructors and students from the academy visited Strasburg 
to become familiar with the European institutions there and observe the 
training of French civil servants.118 Along with the Justice Academy, this 
project worked with penal reforms, with a total price tag of ten million 
                                                
115 Council of Europe, The Budapest Guidelines, pg 4.
116 Council of Europe http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/about_us/activities/Prog_Turkey_DvpsE.pdf
117 Council of Europe http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/about_us/activities/Prog_Turkey_DvpsE.pdf
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41
euros.119 In the third advisory report, the Commission makes it clear that 
they are pleased with the progress of the Justice Academy and have been
quite patient with its continued development. The creation of this new 
institution for educating the judiciary was not a contentious issue for any of 
the actors involved. A possible reason for this could be the low threat to any 
position holders in the judiciary in –contrast to section three of the third 
report—which deals quite specifically with the position of the prosecutor in 
judicial procedure and threatens the appearance of their elevated position in 
the court. It is this area where we find considerable resistance from the 
Ministry of Justice. 
The new Justice Academy will be given the responsibility of educating 
prosecutors and judges about the new criminal procedure code. The 
Ministry plans to instruct prosecutors in the new procedure article 227/1 
which prevents any contact with the judges during their deliberations it was 
written to nullify a recommendation from past reports and is reiterated in 
section 3.120
In section three of the advisory report the Commission recommended a 
number of structural changes to the court buildings and courtrooms 
themselves. The government has moved to put these changes into effect in
their new construction projects. The Turkish government has spent 
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237,810,665 euros to build 66 new courthouses.121 Currently 26 courthouses 
are being built and by the end of 2006, six of them are expected to be 
finished with a total cost of 40,150,303 euros for the six courthouses and a 
grand total of 329,294,545 euros when the last 20 are built.122 There are 9 
more courthouses that have completed the project phase and their expected 
construction cost is 18,636,363 euros with another 29 courthouses still in 
the project phase and 15 more in the investment phase all of which is being 
paid for out of the Ministry of Justice’s budget.123 This is an enormous 
investment on the part of the Turkish government. 
The design of the courthouses can alleviate some of the Commissions 
concerns regarding the affiliation between judges and prosecutors. As 
mentioned in chapter 3, judges and prosecutors currently enter the 
courtroom together through the same door. However, the government 
responds that this will change in the design of the new courtrooms.124
Another concern that can be addressed by a courtroom design change is the 
position of the prosecutor in relation to the judge and the defense attorney. 
Currently the prosecutor is behind the bench next the judge and this seating 
design brings into question the integrity of the judge under the Bangalore 
Principles and can be construed as an instance of judicial dependence in 
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which the prosecutor could violate the insularity of the court. The 
government has changed its approach to this problem twice—the first time 
in 2003, when the Ministry said it would place the prosecutor on the floor 
with the defense attorney.125 This position changed however in 2004 with 
the Ministry now placing the defense attorney at the same level as the 
prosecutor in courtrooms in Ankara, Diyabakır and Erzurum Courts of 
Appeal, which will be open soon.126 The solution is interesting in that,
rather than lowering the prosecutors down and presenting the judge as the 
sole point of authority lending no question to their insularity and 
impartiality in appearance, the Ministry has instead chosen to elevate the 
defense attorney. The government may in fact be making further changes to 
the design in the courtrooms that are still in the project phase.127 The 
question of where the defendant will be positioned has not been answered, 
with the defense attorney elevated to the same position as the prosecutor 
and by extension the judge where will the accused be and how will the 
positioning of their council affect the appearance of justice? 
After touring the Bakırköy Adliye Sarayı (Bakırköy Courthouse), which
was completed in January 2007 with an opening ceremony on the 25th of 
March and began working at full capacity on the 20th of April128, it is clear 
the government has chosen not to include some of the recommendations 
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discussed in Chapter 2 into its design. The prosecutor is still seated next to 
the judges behind an elevated bench. The defense lawyer is still positioned 
on floor level behind a separate table. However, in this courthouse the 
judges’ chambers have been segregated from the prosecutors. The judges’ 
chambers are adjunct to their courtrooms. The prosecutors’ offices by 
contrast are all located in Block 4 of the immense courthouse. 
In figure 1 of the appendix there is a layout of one of the courtrooms. It 
bears little difference to courtrooms already in existence. If the government 
were serious about making changes to the position of the prosecutor in 
respect to the recommendations of the Commission they could easily have 
done so in the Bakırköy Courthouse courtrooms. 
The government maintains that another concern stipulated in the advisory 
report is prosecutors entering and exiting the courtroom through the same 
door as the judge. The Ministry says it will change this in the layout of the 
new courtrooms but resist any change in the current courtrooms.129 As it 
stands now, in many cases it wouldn’t be possible for prosecutors to enter 
and the leave the courtroom with the defense attorney and public because 
they are behind the bench with the judge and cannot reach the public door. 
After the publication of the Commission’s report the Ministry of Justice 
issued a circular which reiterated Article 227 which excludes prosecutors 
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from the courtroom when judges are making their final decision.130
However, since compliance with code to bar prosecutors (who work for the 
Ministry of Justice) from the courtroom is enforced by the Judges and 
Prosecutors High Council,  which isn’t fully autonomous from the Ministry 
of Justice, putting it into practice appears doubtful. 
Along with the equality of elevation and the public prosecutor’s access to 
the same door as the public in the design of the new courthouses the offices 
of the prosecutors will be changed.131 For large complexes the prosecutors 
will be placed in separate blocks from the judges, while in smaller 
courthouse on different floors and for very small houses in another hall or 
down the hall from the judges’ offices.132 In the Bakırköy Courthouse for 
example it was feasible to completely separate the offices because of the 
large size of the building. 
                                                
130 Cumhuriyet savcılarınnın müzakerelere katılmamaları, B.03..0.CİG.0.00.00.05-659-45-2006/34332
131 Bjornberg and Cranston, Report of an Advisory Visit Section 3, p. 21.
132 Bjornberg and Cranston, Report of an Advisory Visit Section 3, p. 21.
46
C o n c l u s i o n
The European Union can not directly state that Turkey has a low level of 
judicial independence or that judicial independence in Turkey is weak or 
make similar loaded statements. The nature of EU politics rightly 
discourages this type of discourse since value judgments such as these are 
difficult to prove; measuring judicial independence is a tricky business that 
is far too murky for politicians to wade into. They have therefore 
established recommendations to reform specific areas of concern in the 
Turkish judicial system while being very careful to appear nonjudgmental. 
However by identifying these recommendations as specific types of judicial 
dependent factors that inhibit either “insularity”, “impartiality” or “scope of 
authority,” an understanding emerges as to what degree reform is really 
needed in the Turkish judiciary.
The mere length of this 85 page document like The Functioning of the 
Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey Report on an Advisory Visit 2005
should be a clear indicator itself of how much reform is still needed. Unlike 
other Chapters under negotiation the recommendations in Chapter 23 are 
not just simply streamlining the bureaucracy. Examination of these 
recommendations shows the impact they may have on the rights of citizens 
to a fair trial that has a significant impact on their daily lives. Looking these 
recommendations through the filter of judicial dependence, we get a clear 
image of a system in dire need of reform. 
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The reforms already made by the Ministry of Justice such as the new court 
building initiatives and the creation of the Justice Academy do give 
encouragement to the process of Turkish accession. Turkey, unlike most 
new member states, has a long judicial history that has been adopted from 
European models; therefore, it doesn’t need reforms as extensive as the ex-
communist states (which were the last entrants into the Union) because it 
was never under the Soviet system. However, because of this entrenchment, 
tossing out the whole system and starting from scratch isn’t really an option. 
Although it is unclear if the Ministry of Justice has the political will to 
complete and implement the reforms enumerated by the Commission in 
anything but a surface level.  
The Commission is asking the Ministry to give some of its power in the 
judiciary over to judges. As any governmental entity it is unlikely to want to 
do this. Not only as an institution but also individuals who work for the 
Ministry such as prosecutors will not want to give up their position in the 
courtroom. Nor will they want to be left out of deliberations. 
It is important to remember that it isn’t the actual independence of the 
judiciary that is being identified in this paper. It is the dependence of the 
judiciary on other branches of the government that is the main concern. In 
this case the Ministry of Justice represented by the prosecutors specifically. 
Each recommendation of the Commission is not a factual indictment of the 
judicial system. They are not making specific claims of actual intrusion of 
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the Ministry of Justice into the workings of the judiciary by prosecutors 
toward judges. They are only pointing out where the relationship between to 
two appears to allow for the possibility of what Larkins identifies as Judicial 
Dependence. 
The lack of insularity between these officers of the court through the use of 
the same door in the courtroom, same lodgings, same segregated courthouse 
restaurant, same elevated bench, same apparent privilege of remaining in 
the courtroom or retiring to judges chambers during deliberations of 
decisions, same governing body making employment and punitive 
decisions, same colored robes, same article of the constitution enumerating 
the duties of their offices, and the same prosecutor assigned to the same
judge for years, is overwhelming evidence that in this area of the judicial 
system there is grave need to do more than the Ministry is doing to address 
the concerns of the Commission. The responses of the Ministry have not 
addressed the most pressing issues identified by the Advisory Report and 
therefore it is the conclusion of this paper due to the relationship between 
the judges and prosecutors (and the lack of insularity it shows) there is a 
preponderance of Judicial Dependence in the Turkish Judiciary.  
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